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Abstract 
 
This report details test and measurement flights to demonstrate autonomous UAV inspection 
of high-voltage electrical transmission structures. A UAV built with commercial, off-the-shelf 
hardware and software, supplemented with custom sensor logging software, measured ultraviolet 
emissions from a test generator placed on a low-altitude substation and a medium-altitude 
switching tower. Since corona discharge precedes catastrophic electrical faults on high-voltage 
structures, detection and geolocation of ultraviolet emissions is needed to develop a UAV-based 
self-diagnosing power grid.  
Signal readings from an onboard ultraviolet sensor were validated during flight with a 
commercial corona camera. Geolocation was accomplished with onboard GPS; the UAV position 
was logged to a local ground station and transmitted in real time to a NASA server for tracking in 
the national airspace. 
Introduction 
Manually piloted UAVs have been deployed routinely to inspect high-voltage electrical 
transmission lines in the past two years [1, 2, 3, 4], and a variety of sensors and concepts for 
autonomous transmission line inspection have been proposed (see [5, 6] for reviews). One or 
more manual flights to test sensors, operational concepts, and autonomy methods are needed 
to verify a particular UAV platform; commonly at least one manual flight within a given flight 
corridor is undertaken to determine inspection poses and to cope with site-specific geography. 
Once a site is surveyed and waypoints along an effective flight inspection corridor are 
determined, autonomous UAV flights can economically reinspect a line section repeatedly. The 
work described in this report follows in that same sequence: exploratory manual flights are 
followed by autonomous flights at two de-energized high-voltage infrastructure locations. 
Most of the technologies described herein are broadly applicable to UAV deployment. In 
addition, this report describes results obtained from a compact UV sensor package developed 
at NASA Langley that is specifically applicable to high-voltage fault detection. In electrical power 
transmission, great care is taken to avoid sharp protrusions on high-voltage structures; electron 
avalanches from high-potential points produce, via impact ionization and subsequent 
recombination of atmospheric plasma, an ultraviolet (UV) photon spray called coronal discharge 
[14]. While most coronas are benign, some are indicative of a severe degradation that requires 
immediate attention; location, diagnosis, and disposition of coronas are necessary components 
of transmission line inspection. The core technology, a sensor based on the photoelectric effect 
and gas multiplication [8], is solar blind and has a wide field of view. An early version of this 
sensor was calibrated against a 100 kV corona [15]; subsequent versions are more sensitive, 
allowing a greater standoff distance from the high-voltage structure.  
Since it is very lightweight, this technology can be mounted on the UAV. If the sensitivity is 
high enough to allow a sufficient standoff distance, a fleet of UAVs equipped with compact UV 
sensors could autonomously inspect high-voltage structures and locate faults that may result in 
a power outage. If distributed across a power grid (for example, at substations), this fleet could 
serve as the detection component of a self-diagnosing power grid (Figure 1). Imagery and other 
telemetry from the UAV deployments could then be interpreted remotely by experienced grid 
operation and line crews, enabling the rapid dispatch of a nearby line crew in a repair truck 
loaded with the components necessary to repair the fault.  
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Figure 1. Components of a self-diagnosing power grid. UAVs cached at locations across the 
grid, such as electrical substations, can be deployed on demand to locate and characterize the 
faults based on geographic outage maps and topological circuit maps. 
Test and Measurement Flights 
Two days of experimental UAV flights were conducted at Dominion Virginia Power’s Chester 
training facility on November 7 and 8, 2016. A variety of commercial transmission structures, de-
energized for training purposes, are located at this facility. The UAV was built with commercial, 
off-the-shelf hardware and software, supplemented with custom sensor logging software. 
Twelve test flights with increasing instrumentation validated the measurement methods at two 
structures: a low-altitude substation, and a medium-altitude switching tower. At the site of each 
structure, manual flights were conducted first, in preparation for a waypoint-based autonomous 
flight. 
A corona generator was placed on each structure, with a coronal UV intensity strength set to 
produce a signal measurable by a pair of onboard ultraviolet sensors. The UAV distance from 
the generator was no closer than 12’ for manual flights, and no closer than 20’ for autonomous 
flights. To validate sensor records, visible and ultraviolet imagery of the flight path was 
recorded. 
UAV position was tracked by the onboard autopilot and saved to a ground computer after 
the flights each day. In addition, the UAV position was forwarded during the flight from the 
ground station computer to a NASA server for real-time traffic management. After all flight data 
capture and recording technologies were operating successfully, as proven in test flights, 
measurement flights were conducted at the two locations. These flights demonstrated, for the 
first time, an autonomously guided UAV with onboard compact UV sensors recording signals 
directly relevant to transmission line fault geolocation, while tracked in the national airspace. 
Selected video clips from these flights may be seen in [19]. 
Flight locations within the Chester training facility are shown in Figure 2. The substation is a 
recently added structure at the east side of the facility, and the switching tower is at the far north 
side, close to Old Stage Road in Chester, Virginia. The video and corona cameras were placed 
200 to 300 feet from the flight locations to accommodate the small depth of field of the corona 
camera. 
Tables 1 and 2 list the details for each flight. Test flights took place on the first day and the 
morning of the second day, and measurement flights took place in the afternoon of the second 
day. Flights are designated according to the structure, day, and flight count1: substation flights 
begin with S1_1 and end with S2_5, while tower flights begin with T1_1 and end with T2_4. 
                                               
 
1 SD_R (S=Substation, D=Day, R=Repetition) and TD_R (T=Tower, D=Day, R=Repetition) 
Outage Map Circuit Graph UAV Fleet  Flight Corridor  
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Tables 1 and 2 are combined in an inventory of all flights in Appendix 1. Appendix 2 
documents all equipment and software used in these flights. 
 
Figure 2. Chester Virginia flight range. Flight and camera positions superimposed on Dominion-
provided lidar. The flight locations and camera recording positions for the substation and tower 
flights were in the northeast corner of the range. A close-up of the switching tower is shown in 
the top left inset, and a satellite image of the facility (for which up is north) is shown in the top 
right inset. ©Lidar data: Dominion Virginia Power; Map data: Google, DigitalGlobe & NASA 
Substation Test and Measurement Flights 
Low-altitude flight maneuvers and sensor checks were accomplished in the substation (S) 
test flights (top of Table 1). After a free-ranging manual flight S1_1 that approached as close as 
12 feet to the target location, the corona source was energized and the UV sensors were tested 
in autonomous flights S1_2 and S1_3, which approached as close as 20 feet to the target 
location. Figure 3 illustrates the physical interpretation of the UV plots in this report, using as an 
example L-shaped UAV flight path of test flight S1_3. Since the corona sensors were on the 
sides of the UAV, the left (port) sensor detected corona during the first leg, and the right 
(starboard) sensor detected corona during the second leg, which was ~8 feet from the concrete 
pad of the structure, and ~20 feet from the substation hardware. With the waypoints used in 
S1_2, the flight ended before the UAV made a full sweep in front of the source, and so the final 
waypoint was moved north for a full sensor sweep (column ‘UV Plot’ of Figure 4).  
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This result was verified in a back-and-forth manual flight in front of 
the substation (S2_1). The UAV was kept oriented approximately north 
so that it was flying forward and then backward multiple times; several 
peaks of signal strength (which correspond to points of nearest 
approach) are seen from the right sensor. Additionally, the UAV flight 
path was transmitted to a remote NASA UAS Traffic Management 
(UTM, reference [7]) server during this flight. 
Finally, corona camera recording and UTM flight path transmission 
was conducted in the trio of measurement flights S2_3, S2_4, and 
S2_5 (Figure 5 and bottom of Table 1)2. The UAV altitude was varied 
in these three flights so as to frame it in the limited field of view of the 
corona camera. Altitudes of 9.8 feet (3 meters; flight S2_3) and 16.4 
feet (5 meters; flight S2_4) were too low and too high, respectively, to 
capture the UAV within the corona camera frame, but an altitude of 
13.1 feet (4 meters; flight S2_5) produced corona camera video 
imagery that independently validated the corona signal detected by the 
onboard sensor (Figure 6).  
Even at low altitude, the S2_5 measurement flight was a 
necessary validation of the methodology, and upon success it was 
justifiable to proceed with a higher altitude measurement at the 
switching tower site. While corona detection at altitudes above 30 feet 
is required for broad applicability of the technique, the substation test 
and measurement flights sufficed to show that all of the basic principles 
were sound and that all of the measurement methods were producing 
valid results. 
 
 
Table 1. Substation test and measurement flights 
Substation Test Flights 
Date Flight Description UV 
Plot 
Flight 
path 
UV 
Image 
Visible 
Image 
UTM 
path 
UTM 
boundary 
Monday, 
Nov 7 
 
S1_1 1st manual flight       
S1_2 1st auton. flight       
S1_3 2nd auton. flight       
Tuesday, 
Nov 8 
S2_1 1st manual flight       
Substation Measurement Flights 
Date Flight Description UV 
Plot 
Flight 
path 
UV 
Image 
Visible 
Image 
UTM 
path 
UTM 
boundary 
Tuesday, 
Nov 8 
S2_3 2nd auton. flight        
S2_4 3rd auton. flight       
S2_5 4th auton. flight       
 
                                               
 
2 Flight S2_2 was aborted and no useful data resulted. Although listed in the flight inventories in the appendices, it 
is not described further. Onboard sensor data was not obtained for flights S1_1 and S2_3. 
Figure 3. Spatial validation of 
the signals from port (left) 
and starboard (right) 
compact UV sensors ©Map 
data: Google, DigitalGlobe & 
NASA 
 
1
st
 leg 
2
nd
 leg 
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Flight and 
Description 
UV Plot Flight Path 
S1_1 
1st manual 
flight 
 
  
S1_2 
1st auton. 
flight 
 
  
S1_3 
2nd auton. 
flight 
 
  
S2_1 
1st manual 
flight 
 
  
 
Figure 4. UV signal and flight path plots for the four substation test flights. The approximate 
distance to the corona generator (12’ or 20’) is indicated for the first three flights, which verified 
the compact UV sensor response. For the final test flight, the flight path was transmitted to the 
NASA UAS Traffic Management (UTM) server, and is shown at the bottom right for flight S2_1. 
©Map data: Google, DigitalGlobe & NASA 
 
 
  
UTM Flight Path 
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Flight 
Alti-
tude 
(m) 
UV Plot 
Autopilot Flight Paths 
(overlay) 
UTM Flight Path 
S2_3 3 (not recorded) 
 
 
S2_4 5 
 
 
S2_5 4 
 
 
Figure 5. Altitude, UV signal and flight path plots for the three substation measurement flights. 
Both autopilot and UTM flight paths are shown; autopilot flight paths for all three flights are 
overlaid in the center column, showing flight paths with three altitudes (3, 5, and 4 meters 
colored green, red, and blue) in frontal and lateral views. The UTM flight paths (right column) 
are shown individually for each flight in frontal view. Note the altitude errors in the UTM plots; 
please see the section Altitude reporting in autopilot and UTM records below for a discussion of 
the origin of these errors and alternative altitude measures. ©Map data: Google, DigitalGlobe & 
NASA 
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Figure 6. Validation of the compact UV sensor signal with corona camera in a substation 
measurement flight. The visible camera image shows the UAV above the substation structure 
(background; UAV is in lightened ellipse). The inset at top right shows the compact UV sensor 
recording, which reaches a maximum as the UAV passes the corona generator. The inset at 
bottom right shows the corona camera record; the bright red blobs at the center of the image 
are locations of UV emission.   
Switching Tower Test and Measurement Flights 
Medium-altitude flight maneuvers and sensor checks were accomplished in the tower (T) 
test flights (top of Table 2; Figure 7)3. A back-and-forth manual flight with increasing altitude 
(T1_1) was executed to frame the UAV in the corona camera’s field of view and to set 
waypoints for an autonomous flight. In two subsequent autonomous flights on day 1 (T1_3 and 
T1_4), the UAV failed to detect an ultraviolet signal and drifted off of the planned flight path 
halfway between the waypoints. The detection failure was due to a poor contact between the 
corona generator’s body and its emitting tip. 
Work at the switching tower resumed in the afternoon of day 2, after a newer corona 
generator (with a solid contact) was placed aloft in the morning. A manual flight (T2_1) was 
executed first to frame the UAV and corona generator in the corona camera view and to 
establish waypoints. As in day 1, just two waypoints were used, one to the west and one to east 
of the tower. Flight from east to west (flight T2_4)4 proceeded along the planned flight path.  
                                               
 
3 Three flights (T1_2, T2_2, and T2_3) were aborted and no useful data resulted. Although listed in the flight 
inventories in the appendices, they are not described further. 
 
4 Two attempts to fly autonomously from west to east failed (T2_2 and T2_3, not shown in Figure 6), because the 
pilot aborted the flight after the UAV drifted south, off of the intended flight path. We speculate that the GPS 
signal was erratic at the west waypoint, situated between the switching tower and a nearby tall steel lattice tower, 
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All experimental datatypes were captured in measurement flight T2_4 (Figure 8): onboard 
UV sensors recorded the generated corona as verified with the ground-based corona camera 
(Figure 8), and the UAV flight path was transmitted to a remote NASA UTM server (bottom right 
of Figure 8; Figure 10). Success at the altitude of the switching tower confirmed the practicality 
of the UAV-based method for corona inspection of transmission line infrastructure.  
It is critical to note that confirmation of practicality is not sufficient to prove adequacy. We 
estimate that the onboard sensor used in these experiments is capable of detecting corona of a 
magnitude produced by an actual 100 kV corona fault at a distance of 12 feet. However, the 
magnitude of the artificial corona source used was set higher than that of a 100 kV corona, so 
that detection could be tested at greater distances. Until the method is verified on actual corona 
faults, we cannot state with certainty that the technologies tested in this study will produce 
diagnostic results. Thus we can claim that the method has practicality and relevance, but not 
adequacy, until it is tested successfully on a calibrated UV source or an actual fault. 
In summary, these flights demonstrated, for the first time, an autonomously guided UAV with 
onboard compact UV sensors recording signals relevant to transmission line fault geolocation, 
while tracked in the national airspace.  
 
Table 2. Tower test and measurement flights 
Tower Test Flights 
Date Flight Description UV 
Plot 
Flight 
path 
UV 
Image 
Visible 
Image 
UTM 
path 
UTM 
boundary 
Monday, 
Nov 7 
T1_1 1st manual flight       
T1_3 2nd auton. flight, 
aborted into alt 
hold 
X      
T1_4 3rd auton. flight, 
aborted into alt 
hold 
X      
Tuesday, 
Nov 8 
T2_1 1st manual flight       
Tower Measurement Flights 
Location Flight Description UV 
Plot 
Flight 
path 
UV 
Image 
Visible 
Image 
UTM 
path 
UTM 
boundary 
Tuesday, 
Nov 8 
T2_4 3rd auton. flight       
 
 
                                               
 
while the GPS signal was stable at the east waypoint, which is comparatively further from a second nearby steel 
lattice tower. 
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Flight and 
Description 
UV Plot Autopilot Flight Path 
T1_1 
1st manual 
flight 
 
  
T1_3 
2nd auton. 
flight 
 
  
T1_4 
3rd auton. 
flight 
 
  
T2_1 
1st manual 
flight 
 
  
Figure 7. UV signal plot and autopilot flight path for the tower test flights. As with the substation 
flights, the standoff distance is 12’ for manual flights and 20’ for autonomous flights. The outputs 
from the compact UV sensor, recorded in the autonomous flights, show no signal, due to a 
corona generator malfunction. ©Map data: Google, DigitalGlobe & NASA  
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Flight and 
Description 
UV Plot Flight Path 
T2_4 
2nd auton. 
flight 
 
  
 
Figure 8. UV signal plot and autopilot flight path for the tower measurement flight T2_4. The 
compact UV sensor records a signal as the UAV passes the corona generator. Both autopilot 
(top right) and UTM (bottom right) flight paths are shown. ©Map data: Google, DigitalGlobe & NASA 
 
Figure 9. Validation of the compact UV sensor signal with corona camera in tower measurement 
flight T2_4. The corona camera imagery (inset at left) verifies the UV sensor result (inset at top 
right). The UAV is framed in a low-contrast oval (white dashed outline) in this imagery. The 
bright red blobs at the center of the corona camera image are locations of UV emission.  
UTM Flight Path 
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Figure 10.  UTM flight path and UTM boundary and buffer ring for measurement flight T2_4. 
(Note: the boundary extends to the south due to a stale home position retained by the autopilot 
from the substation measurement flights earlier in the day.) The UTM path and boundary are the 
representations used to track the UAV flight in the national airspace. ©Map data: Google, 
DigitalGlobe & NASA 
Discussion  
Compact sensor technology and standoff distance   
The UAV was built with commercial, off-the-shelf hardware and software, supplemented with 
custom sensor logging software. The base aircraft platform cost was less than $5K, and 
commercial laptops were used as ground stations. 
One consequence of this low-cost approach is that UAV positional accuracy is too low to 
allow precision autonomous flights. The test signal was increased to compensate for this 
deficiency. In this section, the experimental approach and caveats about interpretation of the 
results are detailed.  
Leveraging new sensor and UAV technology development 
Compact UV sensors promise to supplement or replace corona cameras for finding potential 
high-voltage transmission line faults [1]. Corona camera adoption is limited, at least in part, due 
to camera size, cost, and fragility; compact UV sensor technology is superior in all three of 
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these measures of market fitness. However, corona cameras have exquisite sensitivity to the 
weak UV photon flux density produced by coronas. They are so sensitive that a user with limited 
training can spot a corona from the ground at a distance of 300 feet or more. In contrast, 
compact UV sensors must be located within a few yards of a corona to sense it reliably.   
As a result, compact UV sensors have not been applied in transmission line inspection. Two 
recent technology advances may change this: an increased sensor sensitivity, and the broad 
deployment of UAVs that can deliver the sensor very close to the corona source.  
Device sensitivity and range 
Figure 11 shows the improvement in sensitivity of a commercial line of UV sensors [18] that 
use the photoelectric effect to sense narrow-band UV photons in a Geiger-Mueller tube and 
circuit configuration. The leftmost model was calibrated experimentally at the Electric Power 
Research Institute in July of 2015 to determine detectability of a 100 kV corona [15]. The device 
(R9533, left device in Figure 11) has to be within four feet of the discharge to reliably report a 
signal corresponding to a 100 kV corona (four foot maximum detection distance). Its successor 
(R1753-01, middle device in Figure 11) is twice as sensitive in our laboratory tests (eight foot 
maximum detection distance from a 100 kV corona). In 2016, a new design (R13192, right 
device in Figure 11) yielded an additional 50% higher sensitivity (twelve foot maximum detection 
distance from a 100 kV corona).  
In our laboratory tests of the third generation device (Figure 12), a commercial corona 
generator (Electro-Technic Products BD-20A High Frequency Generator) was energized to 
approximate a 100 kV corona, and a signal was detected at a distance of sixteen feet. This 
exceeds the expected maximum detection distance of twelve feet. This discrepancy was likely 
due to a laboratory corona generator setting that produces more UV flux than a 100 kV corona; 
the depth axis in Figure 12 is scaled by 0.75 to correct this calibration error.  
The devices from each generation have a very wide (>90°) field of view. There are two 
methods to enhance the sensor range, but both add cost and weight and decrease the field of 
view. First, optical focusing with a UV-transparent lens approximately doubles the detection 
distance [11, 12]. However, the quartz lenses are heavy and cost much more than the sensor, 
and the field of view for practical lenses is limited to about 10 degrees. Second, optical focusing 
with a UV-reflective mirror can increase the detection distance by a factor dependent on the 
mirror radius and curvature [9, 10]. Such a mirror will add weight and cost, but the field of view 
can still exceed 90 degrees [9].  
 
 
Figure 11.  Left: The Hamamatsu line of compact UV sensors from the first generation, which 
can sense a 100kV corona at four feet of standoff, to the third generation (R13192), which can 
sense a 100 kV corona at a distance of approximately twelve feet.  
Gen 1 sensor 
R9533: 4’ range 
Gen 2 sensor  
R1753-01: 8’ range 
Gen 3 sensor 
R13192: 12’ range 
Level of sensitivity, model, and standoff estimate for 100kV 
corona 
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Figure 12. Sensitivity profile of the R13192 photoelectric UV sensor, with the corona generator 
set to approximate a 100 kV corona. At left is a top oblique view of the profile, and at right is a 
moderately elevated side view. The sensor location is indicated by the arrow and bulb icon.  
Airborne Standoff Distance and Corona Generator Settings 
For brevity, we use sGPS to indicate single-ended GPS, and dGPS to indicate differential 
GPS [16] in this report.  
To achieve adequate sensing, a UAV equipped with a third generation photoelectric UV 
sensor must carry it to a distance of 12 feet or less from the source of 100 kV corona emission. 
This can be achieved safely for manual flight (i.e., using the joysticks on an RC transmitter) if 
the pilot continuously controls the standoff distance. For autonomous flights, GPS or other 
geolocation methods are needed to enforce standoff.  
Twelve feet is only slightly greater than the accuracy of standard, consumer-grade sGPS. 
GPS accuracy is a statistical quantity, meaningful only for a percentage of measurements. 
Using 95% as the statistical allowance, sGPS accuracy is about six feet in latitude and longitude 
and approximately 2 times poorer in altitude accuracy [17]. UAV autopilots commonly use a 
barometer for altitude correction of sGPS. Figure 13 illustrates this challenge: inexpensive 
sGPS introduces an envelope of positional uncertainty around the UAV that is a large fraction of 
the corridor volume needed for accurate measurement.  
 
 
Figure 13. Flight volume (left), positional uncertainty (middle), and sensing pose (right). With 
single-ended GPS, the positional uncertainty is a large fraction of the desired standoff distance.  
 
Sensor Response to Calibrated Signal Strength 
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An increase in accuracy is possible with differential GPS (dGPS), in which two single-ended 
receivers, one on the UAV and another on the ground station, compute a relative location. 
When operating with full fidelity, dGPS has a positional uncertainty on the order of centimeters. 
We pursued this technology throughout 2016. Our research confirmed that dGPS can, in the 
best case, deliver this accuracy, but that this ideal level of fidelity was intermittent.  
For example, when not attached to a UAV, full accuracy was possible, but when mounted on 
the aircraft it was rare. In fact, the autopilot that we used (Pixhawk controller [13], running 
Arducopter 3.3) will not allow arming and takeoff of a UAV if dGPS accuracy is poor, and we 
could never achieve the required accuracy for arming and takeoff with dGPS guidance.  
Over the course of the year, two other NASA research groups attempted to adopt low-cost 
dGPS technology with varied success. Significantly, if arming and takeoff were successful and 
dGPS “lost lock” (i.e., failed to meet a threshold level of accuracy) during the flight, the autopilot 
would shift to an onboard backup single-ended sGPS. When this shift occurred, the spatial 
control envelope of the UAV would expand from centimeters to meters, and the aircraft would 
jump into a new position estimated from the (low accuracy) single-ended sGPS. This jump, 
while not catastrophic a) is jarring and can lead to pilot overreaction, and b) almost always 
resulted in a mission abort due to autopilot safety protocols. At present, the level of confidence 
in dGPS units small enough to fly on a UAV is very low. To obtain NASA flight safety 
permissions for the Chester flights, we had to remove differential GPS from the research 
program, because of concerns about sudden loss of control.  
To compensate for this, we increased standoff distance for autonomous flights from 12 to 20 
feet (Figure 14). At a twenty foot standoff distance, even a shift of six feet (from the center to the 
outer limit of the positional accuracy envelope) would not result in a collision of the UAV into the 
inspected structure. The corona generator output had to be increased above the 100 kV 
calibration output level to be detectable at a 20 foot distance.  This is why we emphasize the 
following caveat: until the method described in this report is verified on actual corona faults, we 
cannot state with certainty that the technologies tested in this study will produce diagnostic 
results. We can claim that the method has practicality and relevance, but not adequacy, until it 
Figure 14. Distance from corona source in manual and autonomous flights.  Top and side views 
for flights S1_1 (green) and S1_3 (pink) are shown. Due to GPS uncertainty, while manual 
flights approached the 12 foot calibration distance, autonomous flights approached no closer 
than 20 feet (horizontal yellow line). To compensate, the corona generator output was increased 
above calibration levels. ©Map data: Google, DigitalGlobe & NASA 
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is tested successfully on a calibrated UV source or an actual fault. Improved positional accuracy 
is critical to proving adequacy. 
Using only sGPS positional accuracy as a guide, we can conclude (right image of Figure 13) 
that flying beneath power lines is not safe, and that flying to the side (as done in this study) is 
safe but not adequate. Flying over lines using sGPS for navigation is safe, but adequacy is even 
more problematic because sGPS vertical positional uncertainty is 2X greater than sGPS 
horizontal positional uncertainty. If the vertical positional uncertainty can be reduced, then flying 
over lines or above and to the side of them is possible (Figure 15). We did not thoroughly 
quantify the accuracy of the autopilot’s fusion of sGPS and barometer, but the results from 
flights S2_3, S2_4, and S2_5 indicate that the required vertical accuracy is already available. 
Currently available low-cost laser altimeters are rated at ± 0.3 ft (10 cm) at 16.4 ft (5 m) and 
higher altitudes. An example flight geometry with these assumptions is provided in Appendix 3. 
 
Figure 15. Reducing vertical position uncertainty. Left: sGPS uncertainty. Middle: Barometric or 
laser altimeter correction of vertical position estimate, fused with sGPS horizontal position 
estimate. Right: An example safe position that results from improved vertical accuracy. 
Altitude reporting in autopilot and UTM records 
Merging and reconciling the multiple data types gathered in these experiments was 
demanding due to the data volume, but not difficult, with one exception. The UAV autopilot 
forms altitude estimates from barometric, inertial, and sGPS/dGPS sensors, and from 
combinations of these. The estimates are computed relative to ground, relative to takeoff 
altitude and relative to a fixed datum, e.g., sea level. Reconciling the observed and recorded 
altitudes required a survey of all of these computed altitudes, trying each on our mapping tool 
(Google Earth). To render sensible flight paths, custom processing was needed to substitute a 
stable altitude record prior to mapping, because the default record is subject to profound drift as 
shown in Figure 16. A beneficial advance that emerged from this study is the discovery that the 
UTM record, which uses the error-prone default, can be improved with the same simple 
substitution. 
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Figure 16. Altitude reporting among data types. Data is shown for flights S2_3, S2_4, and S2_5, 
with known altitudes of 9.8 ft, 13.1 ft, and 16.4 ft,  (3m, 5m, and 4m), respectively. In this 
autonomous flight series, the UAV flew from south to north, which is from right to left in the 
views shown.  The default UAV altitude is subject to profound drift (red trace at left), but a stable 
form is available in the logs (green trace). At right are the flight paths using the two forms: top, 
the default autopilot log; middle, corrected autopilot log; bottom, UTM record. The UTM stream 
would benefit from substitution of the corrected altitude. 
Advancements for repeated autonomous flights 
Multiple technology developments are required to advance from current manual flights to a 
self-diagnosing grid. In this section, we discuss the outlook for two of them: UAV location 
determination and compact fault sensing. 
Improving positional accuracy 
One technology gap that prevents autonomous UAV inspection flights is positional accuracy. 
Both sGPS and dGPS cannot close the gap, in our view. As discussed above, single-ended 
GPS is not accurate enough to approach a 100 kV corona close enough to measure its UV 
emission with current compact sensors. The two low-cost differential GPS systems that we 
tested are small enough to fly on an under-55-lb UAV, but fail intermittently; this can result in 
abrupt position changes during the UAV flight.  
A long-term goal of UAV research is autonomous navigation in a GPS-denied environment, 
so success without these hindrances would have only been provisional. Location of the UAV via 
sGPS/dGPS is a transitional goal until solid alternatives become available. As a location 
technology, sGPS/dGPS inaccuracy presents obstacles to safe (contactless) UAV-based 
infrastructure inspection that can be mitigated as follows. 
Some possible strategies to advance autonomous measurement adequacy given GPS 
uncertainty are: 
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1. Use autonomous flight segments whenever possible to safely approach the transmission 
structure, supplemented with manual flights as needed 
2. Equip the UAV with reliable (presumably high-cost) differential GPS, or develop 
diagnostics that alert the pilot if high-accuracy flight is not available 
3. Develop alternative positioning technology such as lidar, sonar, radar or stereo vision  
1. Autonomous vs. manual flights and safe separation 
In manual flights, standoff distances adequate for UV sensing is attainable if a pilot has a 
good view of the UAV standoff from the inspection structure. In all flights described in this 
report, the pilot position was chosen to ensure a good view. We designed autonomous flight 
paths (i.e., waypoints) sufficient for successful inspection without manual pilot intervention. Due 
to the horizontal positional uncertainty (95% confidence level) of single-ended GPS (Figure 13), 
we were forced to adopt a conservative and inadequate horizontal standoff distance for 
autonomous flights (Figure 14).   
Flights above (rather than to the side of) inspection structures can take advantage of the 
smaller vertical uncertainty afforded by non-GPS altimetry (Figure 15). Specific examples are 
shown in Figure 17. The placement of static wires, which are sometimes poorly resolved in lidar 
imagery, is an important constraint to consider in developing this approach. 
 
Figure 17. Examples of inspection positions that take advantage of reduced vertical uncertainty 
 
2. Invest in more accurate GPS or diagnostics  
We tested two hobby-grade differential GPS systems that cost $1000 or less, and avoided 
more mature systems that cost $5000 or more, since those systems cost more than the UAV 
itself. High-grade differential GPS packages may offer greater stability and uptime than the two 
packages we tested. 
In the future, low-cost, compact systems can in principle be supplemented with diagnostics 
that indicate whether precision flight is possible from minute to minute. We find signals that may 
serve as such a diagnostic in the raw output of the dGPS systems that we tested, but they are 
not currently available to the pilot. 
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3. Develop alternative positioning technology 
Lastly, other sources of position determination may close the gap that currently hinders 
autonomous UAV inspection flights. Compact sonar detectors are available with specifications 
that claim accurate distance measurement up to about 20 feet. Lidar has a far greater inherent 
range, but compact units with suitable size, power, and spatial resolution are not assured. In 
general, there is a tradeoff: a lidar system has a) small size and power consumption, or b) high 
spatial resolution, but not both. Radar, similarly, is inherently capable, but so far no compact 
units are in widespread use. The hardware required for visual ranging using stereo camera 
streams or a time sequence of images (phodar) is quite compact, but the real-time computation 
needed to make it useful is complex and requires very powerful processors. It may be possible 
in 2017 using onboard processors.  
Multiple sensors  
Our early designs for airborne compact UV sensors used three sensors on each side of the 
UAV, so that a corona source was tracked during approach, at closest separation, and after the 
UAV flew past (Figure 18). This horizontal, fore-mid-aft design offered signal validation and 
directional information at a low cost - each sensor added only modestly to the cost of a UAV. 
We used a downward facing vertical array design in a feasibility study to measure from two 
conductors simultaneously with a UAV flying over them (Appendix 3). Given the arbitrary pose 
angles that may arise in some of the vertical standoff UAV positions sketched in Figure 17, we 
expect that an array of multiple onboard sensors is the most agile and productive approach at 
this stage of research. 
 
Figure 18. Multi-sensor payload design, used to calibrate the first generation sensor. Left: 
concept and prototype. Right: calibration to 100 kV corona at the Electric Power Research 
Institute, July, 2015 [23]. The top right image shows the calibration setup, and the bottom right 
image shows view through a commercial corona camera.  The corona is indicated by white 
spots overlaid on a visible-band image. The red LED flash indicates UV detection. UV imagery 
source: Electric Power Research Institute, Charlotte, NC 
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Conclusion 
In this report, we documented test and measurement flights of a UAV, equipped with a low-
cost UV sensor, at two de-energized high-voltage structures. In the measurement flights, the 
sensor signal was verified with a ground-based commercial corona camera, and the UAV 
position was monitored on a local ground station laptop. Simultaneously, the laptop transmitted 
the UAV position to a remote server that tracked it in the US air space.  
Incidental navigation and sensing technology gaps were reviewed and future improvements 
to mitigate them were recommended. One technology gap that prevents precision autonomous 
UAV inspection flights is positional accuracy. Neither sGPS nor dGPS can close the gap with 
systems that cost less than the UAV. The two low-cost differential GPS systems tested are 
small enough to fly on an under-55-lb UAV, but fail intermittently; this can result in abrupt 
position changes during the UAV flight.  
Other methods for position determination may close the gap that currently hinder precision 
autonomous UAV inspection flights. Compact sonar detectors are available with specifications 
that claim accurate distance measurement up to about 20 feet, but their spatial resolution is 
quite coarse (typical a single distance). Lidar has a far greater inherent range, but compact units 
with suitable size, power, and spatial resolution are not assured. Locating and avoiding wires is 
particularly challenging for current compact LIDAR. In general, there is a tradeoff: a lidar system 
has a) small size and power consumption, or b) high spatial resolution, but not both. Radar, 
similarly, is inherently capable, but so far no compact units are in widespread use. The 
hardware required for visual ranging using stereo camera streams or a time sequence of 
images (phodar) is quite compact, but the real-time computation needed to make it useful is 
complex and requires very powerful processors which are currently not compact enough for 
onboard deployment.  
Increasing the range of onboard UV sensors would lessen the need for precision position 
determination. If the standoff distance can be doubled from 12 feet to 24 feet with compact 
optics, then sGPS would be sufficiently accurate. With a sensitivity improvement high enough to 
allow a safe standoff distance using affordable positioning technology, a fleet of UAVs equipped 
with compact UV sensors could serve as an autonomous detection capability that enables a 
self-diagnosing power grid. 
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Appendix 1. Inventory of Flights 
Table 3. Inventory of flights 
Test flights 
Date Location Flight Description UV 
Plot 
Flight 
path 
UV 
Image 
Visible 
Image 
UTM 
path 
UTM 
boundary 
Monday, 
Nov 7 
 
Substation 
S1_1 1st manual flight       
S1_2 1st auton. flight       
S1_3 2nd auton. flight       
Tower 
T1_1 1st manual flight       
T1_2 1st auton. flight, 
aborted  
      
T1_3 2nd auton. flight, 
aborted  
X      
T1_4 3rd auton. flight, 
aborted  
X      
Tuesday, 
Nov 8 
Substation 
S2_1 1st manual flight       
S2_2 1st auton. flight, 
aborted  
      
Tower 
T2_1 1st manual flight       
T2_2 1st auton. flight, 
aborted  
      
T2_3 2nd auton. flight, 
aborted  
      
Measurement Flights 
Date Location Flight Description UV 
Plot 
Flight 
path 
UV 
Image 
Visible 
Image 
UTM 
path 
UTM 
boundary 
Tuesday, 
Nov 8 
Substation 
S2_3 2nd auton. flight        
S2_4 3rd auton. flight       
S2_5 4th auton. flight       
Tower T2_4 3rd auton. flight       
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Appendix 2. Experimental Equipment 
 
Figure 19. The aircraft FA3WEANXWH was used in all flights. It is comprised of a DJI S1000 
frame, a Pixhawk autopilot, three onboard single-board computers, and custom sensing and 
telemetry electronics.  
 Figure 20.  Left: The Hamamatsu R13192, which can sense a 100 kV corona at a distance of ~ 
12 feet. Center: Sensitivity plot of R13192.  
The Electro-Technic Products BD-20A High Frequency Generator was used to produce 
corona in these experiments. The following were used for image capture and computing: 
UVolle-VC corona camera, Canon EOS 1D Mark II visible camera, Dell Precision M6700 laptop 
(running Centos Linux), Panasonic CF-54 Toughbook (running Windows 8). The following were 
used for communications and control: Spektrum 18 channel transmitter, 3DR 915 MHz 
telemetry link, Verizon Jetpack LTE/Wifi hotspot.  
 
1. Right (Starboard) UV Sensor 
2. Pixhawk GPS 
Antenna/Compass 
3. UV & Telemetry Beaglebone 
4. Left (Port) UV Sensor 
5. Safety Relay 
 
(Not visible) 
Pixhawk autopilot 
Arduino UV sensor processor 
Radio control receiver 
Telemetry transmitter/receiver 
1 
3 
2 
4 
5 
Forward 
Starboard 
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Figure 21. Software package versions (top) and radio frequencies (bottom) used in the flights 
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Table 4. Custom mission software 
Custom 
Software  
Functionality Substrate Origin 
Commbox On-board: gather UV sensor data 
and convert into 
Arducopter/Mavlink telemetry 
protocol, forward commands to 
autopilot, and forward telemtry to 
ground station. 
On ground station: receive UV and 
other telemetry, and log UV data 
to separate file. 
Onboard 
Beaglebone 
Black 
NASA Langley A2I group 
UV_Pulse On-board: read from each UV 
sensor, encode pulse count and 
send to Commbox 
Onboard 
Arduino Uno 
NASA Langley A2I group 
UTM client Ground-to-server: gather UAV 
location estimate from 
groundstation telemetry and post 
to UTM server 
Panasonic 
Toughbook 
NASA Ames UTM group 
RelAlt Postprocessing: script to substitute 
relative altitude (instead of 
absolute altitude) before export 
from telemetry log to KML, for 
rendering in Google Earth 
Any NASA Langley A2I group 
Icarous On-board: compare autopilot 
location estimate to preplanned 
flight path and correct trajectory as 
needed to return to flight path. 
Installed but not activated. 
Onboard 
Beaglebone 
Black 
NASA Langley Icarous group 
Geofence 
uploader 
Ground-to-air: read geofence and 
obstacle field polyhedra and send 
to Icarous. Installed but not 
activated. 
Groundstation 
Dell 
NASA Langley A2I group 
 
Appendix 3. Example flight geometry 
Figure 22 and Figure 23 illustrate an example flight geometry with the following 
assumptions:  
1) No lens 
2) 3rd generation UV sensor with manufacturers’ sensitivity estimate 
3) Spatial sensitivity profile the same as the 2nd generation sensor 
4) Maximum detection distance (as determined from a 100kV test) is 12’ 
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With the conservative assumption that it takes one second to store and geostamp the UV 
sensor telemetry, the top flight speed is 14 feet per second (9.5 miles per hour). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7’ 
12’ 
30° 
1.6’ 
17’ 
12’ 
8’ 
9’ 
48° 
Figure 22. Example flight geometry for transmission line with conductors separated by 17 feet (view 
along the conductors). Due to the maximum sensing distance of twelve feet, two passes of the UAV 
carrying two sensors are needed. At an eight foot height above the midline between 2 phases is, the 
sensors should be mounted 48° from vertical. 
Figure 23. Example flight geometry for transmission line with conductors separated by 17 feet (view 
from above, looking down at the conductors). According to the sensitivity plots from the sensor 
manufacturer (not shown), each sensor will be at 95% sensitivity 30° in front of and behind the current 
location. For a standoff distance of twelve feet, this corresponds to a fourteen foot field of view. 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8/98) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18
Form Approved 
OMB No. 0704-0188
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data
sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other
aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other
provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.   
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
1.  REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 2.  REPORT TYPE 3.  DATES COVERED (From - To)
4.  TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a.  CONTRACT NUMBER
5b.  GRANT NUMBER
5c.  PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER  
5d.  PROJECT NUMBER
5e.  TASK NUMBER
5f.  WORK UNIT NUMBER
6.  AUTHOR(S)
7.  PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8.  PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
     REPORT NUMBER
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT 
      NUMBER(S)
9.  SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
12.  DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
13.  SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
14.  ABSTRACT
15.  SUBJECT TERMS
16.  SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
a.  REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE
17.  LIMITATION OF 
       ABSTRACT
18.  NUMBER
       OF  
       PAGES 
19a.  NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
19b.  TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) 
            (757) 864-9658
  
  
 
NASA Langley Research Center 
Hampton, VA 23681-2199
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Washington, DC 20546-0001
NASA-TM-2017-219611
L-20808
01-05-2017 Technical Memorandum
STI Help Desk (email: help@sti.nasa.gov)
U U U UU
Air traffic; Autonomous flight; Electric power; Infrastruvture Inspection; UAV; UTM; UV sensing
  
Autonomous Inspection of Electrical Transmission Structures with Airborne UV 
 Sensors - NASA Report on Dominion Virginia Power Flights of  November 2016
  
Moore, Andrew J.; Schubert, Matthew; Rymer, Nicholas
  
30
NASA
     154692.02.70.07.02   
Unclassified  
Subject Category  01 
Availability: NASA STI Program (757) 864-9658
The report details test and measurement flights to demonstrate autonomous UAV inspection of high voltage electrical transmission structures. A UAV built with 
commercial, off-the-shelf hardware and software, supplemented with custom sensor logging software, measured ultraviolet emissions from a test generator placed on a 
low-altitude substation and a medium-altitude switching tower. Since corona discharge precedes catastrophic electrical faults on high-voltage structures, detection and 
geolocation of ultraviolet emissions is needed to develop a UAV-based self-diagnosing power grid. Signal readings from an onboard ultraviolet sensor were validated 
during flight with a commercial corona camera. Geolocation was accomplished with onboard GPS; the UAV position was logged to a local ground station and transmitted 
in real time to a NASA server for tracking in the national airspace.
